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I. Introduction
Recent outbreaks of food-borne illnesses have raised concerns about the
adequacy of protection measures designed to ensure food safety.
1  Illnesses
can result from contamination introduced at a number of possible points,
including the production stage, the processing stage, and the distribution
and use stage.  The first two of these are controlled by producers.  In the
third stage, users can affect safety as well, through, for example, proper
washing and food preparation. 
Incentives for producers to undertake protective measures can be
provided either through the market (e.g., demand side shifts created
through reputation or certification and labeling) or through public policy
design (e.g., imposition of liability for damages, or direct regulation of
processes or product quality).
2  While the federal government has a long
history of regulation of food quality and safety,
3 there has been a trend
toward increased regulation in recent years.  For example, the USDA has
recently required firms in food processing plants to implement Hazard
Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems designed to improve
food safety.
4  There is, however, a considerable debate about whether
mandatory controls are necessary, since some firms had already chosen to
implement HACCP systems voluntarily (Caswell and Henson 1997).  The
question is whether reliance on voluntary measures would lead to adequate
consumer protection.
5
                    
     
1  See Antle (1995) for a discussion of issues related to food safety policy.
     
2  Of course, market outcomes reflect public policies.  Thus, the incentives
created through public policy design can work through the market as well.  See
further discussion below.
     
3 For a detailed list of references on food safety regulation, see Caswell (1988).
     
4 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration (1995) and U.S. Department of
Agriculture (1996).  For discussions of HACCP, see Pierson and Corlett (1992),
Mortimore and Wallace (1994), Unnevehr and Jensen (1996), Mazzocco (1996),
Caswell and Hooker (1996), and Antle (1998).  For a discussion of the benefits and
costs of adopting a HACCP system, see GAO (1996) and Roberts et al. (1996). 
     
5 Caswell and Henson (1997) distinguish between "private" and "public" quality
control systems, where private systems are voluntarily adopted by firms.  In their
terminology, the question is whether private systems are likely to lead to adequate
protection.
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To date there has been little formal discussion in the food safety
literature of the choice between voluntary and mandatory approaches to
consumer protection.  However, this choice is not unique to food safety. A
similar question has arisen in the context of environmental policy design,
6
and researchers have begun to model this choice explicitly in that context.
7
Historically, control of environmental externalities has relied
primarily on the use of regulatory mechanisms that impose requirements
or restrictions on the operations of potentially polluting firms.  While these
regulations have generally been credited with generating significant
reductions in emissions of environmental pollutants, there is also a
consensus that comparable reductions could have been achieved at lower
cost (e.g., Tietenberg 1985).  The lack of flexibility embodied in most
"command-and-control" regulations prevents firms from choosing cost-
minimizing pollution control strategies.  Recently, attention has been
turning to the use of voluntary agreements as an alternative to traditional
regulatory mechanisms for controlling pollution.  The hope is that
voluntary approaches will allow firms greater flexibility in meeting
emission reduction goals and will hence achieve those goals at lower costs.
 There is a growing body of literature suggesting that under some
conditions increased reliance on voluntary agreements would be desirable.
8
This paper draws on the recent literature on voluntary agreements for
environmental protection to examine the question of whether a voluntary
approach to food safety is likely to lead to adequate consumer protection. 
We begin by delineating three alternative types of voluntary approaches,
each involving a different role for the government.  In the following section
we present a framework that can be used to identify the factors that are
likely to determine whether firms choose to undertake protective measures
voluntarily.  We then use a simple model of product safety to examine the
conditions under which demand responses are likely to provide incentives
for efficient investment in food safety.  The results suggest that the market
may work well to induce voluntary adoption of food safety measures for
certain types of goods but not for others.  The key distinguishing
characteristic between the cases is the extent to which consumers and
producers correctly perceive food contamination risks.
II. Types of Voluntary Approaches
In the context of environmental protection, a number of different types of
voluntary approaches have been identified.  Borkey and Glachant (1997)
                    
     
6 See Davies et al. (1996) and EC (1996) for descriptions of voluntary
environmental programs in the U.S. and Europe, respectively.
     
7 See, for example, Segerson and Miceli (1997), Wu and Babcock (1996), Bosch
et al. (1995), Stranlund (1995), and Carraro and Siniscalco (1996).
     
8 See references in footnote 7.Kathleen Segerson 3
identify three alternative approaches.
9  First, firms could make unilateral
commitments to reduce environmental contamination.  Under this
approach, the initiative is taken by the firms or the industry as a whole. 
The government does not play an active role in determining the industry
response.  In the context of food safety, this would be comparable to firms
voluntarily deciding to implement a HACCP system in response to market
or public pressure, without any explicit prompting by the government. 
Similarly, firms could voluntarily change their product or production
processes (e.g., switch to organic farming) in an effort to provide greater
food safety to consumers.  Producers who undertake voluntary changes
might then develop a system of voluntary private certification.
10
Under the second approach, environmental agreements are formally
negotiated (one-on-one) between industry and public authorities.  In such
cases, the firm or industry agrees to undertake some environmental
protection "voluntarily", usually in exchange for some concession granted
by the government.  This concession could take the form of a guarantee
that the government would not impose mandatory standards on the firm.
11
 Thus, the firm is essentially induced to participate through the threat of
imposition of mandatory controls if a voluntary agreement is not reached (a
"stick" approach).  Alternatively, the firm could be induced to participate
through positive inducements such as subsidies designed to help offset
some of the costs associated with undertaking the protective actions (a
"carrot" approach).  In the context of food safety, the firm or industry
might voluntarily agree to implementation of a HACCP approach in
exchange for a forestalling of mandatory HACCP systems that would allow
the firm less flexibility, or in exchange for some form of subsidy (e.g., tax
breaks).
Finally, the public authority could develop a voluntary scheme and then
seek participation by individual firms.  For example, the U.S. Department
of Agriculture has historically used voluntary programs such as the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and more recently the
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) to induce farmers to
withdraw environmentally damaging land from production.
12  These
programs offer farmers payments in exchange for voluntary land
retirements.  Similar approaches could be used to induce farmers to switch
                    
     
9 See also Baggott (1986) and Goodin (1986).
     
10 A program of this type is the ISO 9000 series.  See Hooker and Caswell
(1997).
     
11 This seems to be the inducement behind the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency's 33/50 Program and Project XL.  See Davies et al. (1996) for an evaluation
of the success of these and other EPA voluntary programs.
     
12 For other examples in the context of agriculture (where subsidies have been
common), see Babcock et al. (1996), Cooper and Keim (1996), Norton et al.
(1994), Wu and Babcock (1996a), and Wu and Babcock (1995).  For an analysis of
farmer incentives to participate in such programs, see Segerson (1997a, 1997b).4 Mandatory vs. Voluntary Approaches to Food Safety
to production practices that provide greater food safety.  For example, the
government could establish a program under which farmers are paid for
acreage on which integrated pest management or organic farming
techniques are used.  Such a program could have the dual goal of reducing
water pollution and reducing pesticide residues on food.
Of course, the need for government intervention, either through direct
negotiation with individual firms/industries or through the establishment of
general voluntary programs, depends on the incentives that firms face to
undertake protective measures voluntarily in the absence of any
intervention.  In the following section, we present a simple framework for
examining a firm's incentives to undertake voluntary food safety measures.
 This framework highlights the factors that can be significant in
determining those incentives and hence in determining the likely
effectiveness of reliance on voluntary measures.
III. A Framework For Voluntary Adoption
Figure 1 depicts the basic choice facing a firm
13 that has two alternative
courses of action: (1) to undertake measures to ensure increased food safety
voluntarily, or (2) not to take any initiative unless forced (or induced) to do
so by government regulations or other forms of mandatory public
policies.
14  This choice could be in the context of the first type of voluntary
approach discussed above, where the firm takes the initiative to undertake
voluntary measures without any explicit government program in place. 
Alternatively, it could be in the context of the third type of approach, where
the firm makes a decision about whether or not to participate in a voluntary
program that has been established by the government.
15  We do not
consider explicitly the second type of agreement, under which the firm and
the regulator negotiate or bargain one-on-one over a level of voluntary
compliance.
16
                    
     
13 We present the framework in the context of an individual firm.  In some cases,
a group of firms or an industry may be faced with this choice.  See Segerson
(1997a) for a related model with multiple firms.
     
14 This basic structure has been used in models of voluntary approaches to
environmental protection.  See Segerson and Miceli (1997), Segerson (1997a), and
Segerson (1997b).
     
15 We do not consider explicitly the government's decision about whether or not
to establish such a program.  That decision would clearly depend on the firm's
anticipated reaction to the program, which is depicted in Figure 1.  For a model that
presents the regulator's choice explicitly in the context of environmental protection,
see and Segerson and Miceli (1997) and Segerson (1997a).
     
16 Segerson and Miceli (1997) present a model of this type of agreement in the
context of environmental protection.  They have shown that under some conditions
agreements resulting from this type of negotiation may lead to low levels of
protection.  However, since environmental damages are imposed on third parties
(rather than on the consumer of the product whose production created theKathleen Segerson 5
As shown in Figure 1, if the firm chooses to undertake protective
measures voluntarily, there is some probability q (0£q£1) that a
contamination episode will occur.
17  In most cases, we would expect the
protective measures to reduce the likelihood of contamination but not to
eliminate it completely.  Thus, q>0.  However, if those measures ensure a
completely safe product, then q=0.   
The payoffs from undertaking protective measures voluntarily depend on
the associated costs and benefits.  Let Cv denote the additional cost the firm
incurs as a result of undertaking the measures voluntarily.  The magnitude
of Cv reflects the fact that voluntary adoption keyed to performance
standards allows the firm maximum flexibility in choosing the means by
which those standards will be met. We would thus expect Cv to represent
the minimum cost of ensuring a particular level of product safety.  Let S
represent the amount of the subsidy, if any, that the firm receives as a result
of voluntary adoption of food safety measures.  The magnitude of the
subsidy that the government might be willing to pay to induce voluntary
adoption will depend on a number of factors, including the social cost of
raising the funds necessary to finance the subsidy and the expected benefit
from voluntary adoption.
18  Let Bv denote the benefit that the firm receives
from voluntary adoption.  Bv will reflect not only revenue (net of
production costs) from the sale of its product, including any increase in
revenue due to increased demand for the product because of its increased
safety, but also any public relations benefits (e.g., increased current or
future demand because of increased "good will" toward the firm).  Finally,
let L denote the firm's expected loss as a result of a contamination episode.
 The magnitude of L will reflect a number of factors, including the
magnitude of the actual damages to the victim, the liability rule that is
                                        
externality), the firm does not internalize any of the external costs through the
market.  As will be seen below, in the context of food safety where the damages are
borne by the consumer of the product, the market can sometimes provide a
mechanism for internalizing some of those damages.  Given this, we would expect
the outcome of a bargaining between firms and the government over voluntary
measures to lead to greater levels of protection than would have been the case in the
absence of any internalization.
     
17 Because our interest is in firm-level incentives, we focus here on
contamination that can occur during the production or processing stages.  We do not
explicitly consider the role that consumers can play in determining damages
through use of safe handling procedures.  Instead, we simply interpret q as the
probability of contamination given some level of care taken by consumers to avoid
ingestion of contaminated food.  We note, however, that the level of care that is
likely to be taken by consumers will depend on a number of factors, including the
information they have regarding potential contamination and the liability rule in
place.  See further discussion below.
     
18 See Segerson and Miceli (1997) for a model that explicitly incorporates the
government's decision regarding the magnitude of a subsidy for voluntary measures
for environmental protection.6 Mandatory vs. Voluntary Approaches to Food Safety
operative, the likelihood the source of the contamination is detected and the
firm is held liable, and the severity of the public response (e.g., reduced
future purchases due either to a perceived reduction in the safety of the
product or to consumer boycotts as manifestations of public outcry).
19 
Given these costs and benefits, the firm's payoff from voluntarily
undertaking the protective measures is Bv+S-Cv-L if contamination still
occurs and Bv+S-Cv if no contamination occurs.  Thus, the expected payoff
is simply Bv+S-Cv-qL.
If the firm does not undertake voluntary measures, or equivalently
chooses not to participate in a voluntary government program, then there is
some probability r (0£r£1) that the regulator will impose mandatory
controls or standards.  If the imposition of mandatory standards is
guaranteed if a voluntary approach is not adopted, then r=1.  Alternatively,
if there is no threat of imposition of mandatory standards, then r=0.  More
generally, the firm might expect that there is some likelihood of mandatory
standards, i.e., it might perceive r to lie in the open interval (0,1). 
We assume that the outcome of the voluntary measures (if adopted) is
the same as the outcome of the mandatory standards that might be
imposed.  For example, if the protective measure under consideration is a
HACCP system, we assume that a HACCP system adopted voluntarily
would provide the same level of food safety as a possible mandatory
system.  Alternatively, if the voluntary measures are keyed to performance
standards, we assume that any mandatory measures that might be imposed
would be designed to ensure the same level of performance.
20  This
essentially assumes that the target level of performance is the same
regardless of whether the protection stems from voluntary measures or
mandatory policies.  Thus, we do not allow the possibility that the firm
could forestall mandatory controls by undertaking a level of protection less
than the target level set by the government.
21
In the context of Figure 1, the above assumption implies that the
probability of contamination would be the same for mandatory and
voluntary standards.  Thus, as shown in Figure 1, if the firm does not
undertake voluntary measures and the government responds with
mandatory standards, a contamination episode will still occur with
probability q.  If contamination occurs, the firm's payoff is Bm-Cm-L, where
Bm is the benefit of meeting the mandatory standard and Cm is the
associated cost.  The payoff when no contamination occurs is simply Bm-
Cm.  If the mandatory standard is identical to the one that might have been
                    
     
19 Caswell and Henson (1997) argue that the loss of reputation and market sales
are likely to be of more importance to firms that the direct damage costs imposed
through liability.
     
20 This is not necessarily the case when firms negotiate with regulators over
levels of protection.  See Segerson and Miceli (1997).
     
21 This assumption could be easily relaxed by allowing the probabilities of
contamination to differ for the two approaches.Kathleen Segerson 7
chosen voluntarily, then the direct market benefits of meeting the standard
should be the same regardless of whether the standard was met voluntarily.
 In other words, the quality of the product will be identical and hence the
direct consumer benefits (as reflected in willingness-to-pay) will be
identical.  However, the firm is not likely to receive much in the way of
public relations benefits (e.g., good will) from meeting a mandatory
standard.  Since these public relations benefits are included in Bv, we
would expect Bv‡Bm.  Similarly, since Cv represents the minimum cost of
meeting the standard, Cm cannot be less than Cv, i.e., Cm‡Cv.  The actual
magnitude of Cm will depend on the nature of the mandatory controls, as
well as the transactions costs associated with meeting the mandatory
standard.  If those controls specify not only a performance standard but
also a process or design standard, i.e., they also specify how the
performance standard is to be met, then it is possible that the standard will
not be met in a least cost way.
22  Conversely, if the mandatory controls
simply take the form of a performance standard, they allow the firm
maximum flexibility in deciding how to meet the standard.  In this case,
the firm would still be free to choose the least cost method.  Even in this
case, however, if compliance with the mandatory controls generates
significant transactions costs, we would expect Cm>Cv.
If the firm does not adopt the measures voluntarily and the government
does not impose a mandatory standard, then no protection measures are put
in place.  As a result, the probability of contamination is higher than it
would have been with the standards.  Let p denote the probability of
contamination without controls, where p>q.  Without controls, the firm's
payoff is Bo-L if contamination occurs and simply Bo if it does not.  In this
case, Bo reflects the revenue from the sale of the product, given the higher
probability of contamination.
A comparison of the expected payoffs from the tree depicted in Figure 1
suggests that the firm will choose to undertake the protective measures
necessary to meet the given standard voluntarily if and only if
23
(1) Bv+S-Cv-qL ‡ ‡ r[Bm-Cm-qL] + (1-r)[Bo-pL].
To understand the implications of (1), we consider some special cases. 
First, suppose that the government plays no role in promoting food safety. 
In other words, it offers no subsidies and there is no threat of direct
regulation, implying S=r=0.  In this case, (1) reduces to
                    
     
22 Food safety controls have historically focused primarily on process-related
requirements.  Recently, however, there has been a shift in the nature of some
regulation, toward granting more flexibility to firms.  See Caswell and Henson
(1997), Caswell and Hooker (1996), and Unnevehr and Jensen (1996) for related
discussions.
     
23 This assumes that firms are risk neutral, or that they are able to diversify risks
through the purchase of insurance or other risk spreading mechanisms.8 Mandatory vs. Voluntary Approaches to Food Safety
(2) Bv-Cv-qL ‡ ‡ Bo-pL,
or, equivalently,
(2') (Bv-Bo) + (p-q)L ‡ ‡ Cv.
This condition implies that the firm will undertake protective measures
voluntarily (without any government inducement) if and only if the market
benefits of doing so plus the reduction in expected damages the firm will
have to pay exceeds the cost of the voluntary measures.
Suppose instead that a mandatory standard is inevitable if protective
measures are not adopted voluntarily, i.e., r=1.  In this case, the firm will
adopt the measures voluntarily if and only if
(3) Bv+S-Cv ‡ ‡ Bm - Cm.
Note that this condition is independent of L, since the firm's expected loss
is the same regardless of whether the protection is undertaken voluntarily
or imposed by the government.  In addition, given Bv‡Bm and Cv£Cm,
condition (3) always holds, even without any subsidies, i.e., even with S=0.
 Thus, the firm will always undertake the measures voluntarily if
mandatory controls are certain, since it can reap a potential public relations
benefit and possibly incur lower costs by doing so. 
The framework presented here suggests that the decision about whether
to adopt voluntary measures depends on the interaction between a number
of factors, including (I) the expected change in net revenues (through shifts
in demand), (ii) the likelihood that mandatory controls will be imposed if a
voluntary approach is not successful, (iii) the cost differential between
meeting the standard voluntarily and being forced to meet it (perhaps in a
more costly way), (iv) the legal rules regarding the payment of damages for
 injuries from contamination, and (v) the availability of any direct financial
inducements from the government.  For example, as expected, voluntary
adoption is more likely in markets where consumer demand for the product
is sensitive to product safety.  Likewise, the mere threat of possibly less
flexible and hence more costly mandatory standards can induce voluntary
adoption.  The greater the threat is, the more likely is voluntary adoption. 
However, this incentive requires that there be some potential gain from
voluntary adoption, in the form of either reduced compliance or transaction
costs or increased public "good will" from voluntary adoption.  If there is
no threat of regulation and demand is unresponsive to product safety, then
the firm will undertake voluntary measures only if the expected reduction
in damage payments exceeds the expected costs.  Of course, if firms are notKathleen Segerson 9
required to pay damages,
24 then in the absence of a responsive market or
the background threat of regulation, they would face no incentive to invest
in voluntary food safety measures.
IV. The Role of the Market
As noted above, two key determinants of the decision to undertake
protective measures voluntarily are the expected changes in the net revenue
that would be earned by the firm and the expected loss that the firm would
incur with and without those measures.  However, depending on the
structure of the market and the nature of the product and damages, these
two determinants may not be independent.  The crucial issue in
determining their independence is whether consumers correctly perceive
the potential hazards associated with consumption of the product and
hence adjust their willingness-to-pay for the product accordingly. 
Antle (1998) distinguishes among three different categories of goods,
depending on the information about the safety of the good that is available
to consumers.
25  The first category is search goods.  This includes goods
for which the consumer is able to obtain information about the safety of the
good either through inspection or through readily available information
about the product.  For such goods consumers have near perfect
information about product safety before purchasing the good.  The second
category is experience goods, which includes goods for which the
consumer can obtain information about the product safety through repeated
purchases or through reputations established by purchases by others. 
While the information set of the consumer may not be complete at the time
of the initial purchase, in long run equilibrium the consumer will have near
perfect information about product quality.  Because of the information that
is available to consumers, we would expect the demand for both search and
experience goods to be responsive to changes in product safety.
26
The third category of goods is credence goods, where information about
product safety cannot be discerned by the consumer, even after repeated
consumption of the good.  For such goods, the demand for the product will
not be responsive to changes in product safety since consumers will be
                    
     
24 Failure to pay for damages might result either from the lack of an explicit
designation of firm liability or because of imperfections in the application of the
relevant liability principle.  See further discussion below.
     
25  See also Darby and Karni (1973).
     
26 Theoretical models of the effect of food safety on consumer demand are
presented in Smallwood and Blaylock (1991) and Choi and Jensen (1991). 
Researchers have examined historical responses to changes in food safety
information (see, e.g., van Ravenswaay and Hoehn (1991) for a study of Alar
residues on apples).  In addition, surveys have been used to estimate changes in
demand due to perceived changes in food safety.  See, for example, Preston et al.
(1991), and a number of studies presented in Caswell (1995). 16 Mandatory vs. Voluntary Approaches to Food Safety
however, that, while the assignment of liability may not affect the output
and safety decisions of firms, it could have other important effects.  For
example, if consumers are not compensated for damages, they will have
greater incentives to take whatever steps they can to reduce the likelihood
and magnitude of contamination.  For example, they will have a greater
incentive to use safe handling and food preparation practices.
44  However,
when the possibility of contamination is not completely eliminated, then a
rule of no liability imposes significant risk on consumers, which may be
very costly.  If consumers are risk averse and unable to diversify the risks
associated with consumption of contaminated food, then the optimal
assignment of liability would balance risk allocation and incentives for safe
handling and preparation by consumers.
45
While the market may work well to induce voluntary adoption of food
safety measures for search and experience goods, the above results also
suggest that it will not work well for credence goods.  In particular, if
consumers are unaware of or even simply underestimate potential
damages, then even when producers are fully aware, anything less than full
liability will lead to overproduction of the good and under provision of food
safety.  Since in practice it is unlikely that firms will always be held fully
liable even under a strict liability rule (due, for example, to the difficulty of
proving causation for credence goods), it is unlikely that firms would invest
in an efficient level of protection simply in response to market forces. 
Thus, in the case of credence goods, adequate consumer protection is likely
to be achieved only with some form of government intervention.  However,
this does not necessarily imply that mandatory regulations must be
imposed.  As shown in Section III, even in the absence of market-driven
incentives for investment in food safety, firms might still choose to invest
voluntarily if induced to do so by a "carrot" or "stick."  Through either
government-financed inducements or the threat of possibly more costly
mandatory controls, firms can be induced to undertake protective measures
voluntarily.  If this approach is unsuccessful, however, the government
must be prepared to follow through on its threat and impose mandatory
standards if adequate food safety is to be ensured.
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